Thread

Old Nostr DM (NIP-4) integrates four capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, a receiving address, and a sending address. The encryption key in NIP-4 does not change, so NIP-4 messages lack both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Consequently, if the private key is compromised, both historical and future messages can be exposed. The receiving and sending addresses remain constant, which poses a severe issue for metadata privacy in NIP-4 messages; Everyone can see who (ID) is sending messages to whom (ID). Currently, most Nostr apps use NIP-4 for DM functionalities, such as Damus and Primal. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” New Nostr DM (NIP-17) integrates three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address. Kind-17 separates the sending address from the ID, making the sending address random and concealing the sender's real ID, thus improving metadata privacy. The encryption key in NIP-17 does not change, so NIP-17 messages also lack forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Once the private key is leaked, both historical and future messages will be compromised. The receiving address remains constant, so there is still a slight issue with metadata privacy in NIP-17 messages; everyone can see who (ID) is receiving messages. Apps like 0xchat and Amethyst use NIP-17 to implement DM functionalities. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” In Keychat, the ID, encryption key, receiving address, and sending address are separated. The encryption key, the receiving address, and the sending address are updated independently and continuously. Keychat's encryption key is derived using the Signal protocol, and each message uses a unique encryption key, which is deleted after use. Thus, Keychat messages have both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Even if an encryption key is compromised, only the current message can be leaked, and historical and future messages remain secure. Keychat's sending address is randomly generated for each message. Therefore, external parties do not know the sender's ID. Keychat's receiving address is derived using the Signal protocol, with almost every message using a unique receiving address. Thus, external parties do not know the receiver's ID. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” However, it's important to emphasize that NIP-4 and NIP-17 offer superior multi-device synchronization capabilities because they integrate three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address.

Replies (23)

๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ
PSA
Keychat's avatar Keychat
Old Nostr DM (NIP-4) integrates four capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, a receiving address, and a sending address. The encryption key in NIP-4 does not change, so NIP-4 messages lack both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Consequently, if the private key is compromised, both historical and future messages can be exposed. The receiving and sending addresses remain constant, which poses a severe issue for metadata privacy in NIP-4 messages; Everyone can see who (ID) is sending messages to whom (ID). Currently, most Nostr apps use NIP-4 for DM functionalities, such as Damus and Primal. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” New Nostr DM (NIP-17) integrates three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address. Kind-17 separates the sending address from the ID, making the sending address random and concealing the sender's real ID, thus improving metadata privacy. The encryption key in NIP-17 does not change, so NIP-17 messages also lack forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Once the private key is leaked, both historical and future messages will be compromised. The receiving address remains constant, so there is still a slight issue with metadata privacy in NIP-17 messages; everyone can see who (ID) is receiving messages. Apps like 0xchat and Amethyst use NIP-17 to implement DM functionalities. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” In Keychat, the ID, encryption key, receiving address, and sending address are separated. The encryption key, the receiving address, and the sending address are updated independently and continuously. Keychat's encryption key is derived using the Signal protocol, and each message uses a unique encryption key, which is deleted after use. Thus, Keychat messages have both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Even if an encryption key is compromised, only the current message can be leaked, and historical and future messages remain secure. Keychat's sending address is randomly generated for each message. Therefore, external parties do not know the sender's ID. Keychat's receiving address is derived using the Signal protocol, with almost every message using a unique receiving address. Thus, external parties do not know the receiver's ID. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” However, it's important to emphasize that NIP-4 and NIP-17 offer superior multi-device synchronization capabilities because they integrate three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address.
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็Žฐๅœจ็š„ #nostr ็š„โ€œๅ”ฏไธ€ๅ•็ง้’ฅ่ง„ๅˆ™โ€ไบ‹ๅฎžไธŠๆ˜ฏไธ€ไธชๅทจๅคง็š„ๆผๆดž่ฎพ่ฎกใ€‚ ๅบ”่ฏฅๆ˜ฏ่ฎพ่ฎกๆˆไธ€ๅฅ—ๆƒๆ•ˆ้€’ๅ‡็š„็ง้’ฅๆŽ’ๅบ้›†ๅˆ๏ผš{<โ‘  ไธปๅฏ†้’ฅ,โ‘ก ่ทจๅฎขๆˆท็ซฏๆดปๅŠจๅฏ†้’ฅ,โ‘ขๅ‘ๅธ–ๅฏ†้’ฅ>}ใ€‚
So has anyone messed with this? Anyone wanna give it a try?
Keychat's avatar Keychat
Old Nostr DM (NIP-4) integrates four capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, a receiving address, and a sending address. The encryption key in NIP-4 does not change, so NIP-4 messages lack both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Consequently, if the private key is compromised, both historical and future messages can be exposed. The receiving and sending addresses remain constant, which poses a severe issue for metadata privacy in NIP-4 messages; Everyone can see who (ID) is sending messages to whom (ID). Currently, most Nostr apps use NIP-4 for DM functionalities, such as Damus and Primal. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” New Nostr DM (NIP-17) integrates three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address. Kind-17 separates the sending address from the ID, making the sending address random and concealing the sender's real ID, thus improving metadata privacy. The encryption key in NIP-17 does not change, so NIP-17 messages also lack forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Once the private key is leaked, both historical and future messages will be compromised. The receiving address remains constant, so there is still a slight issue with metadata privacy in NIP-17 messages; everyone can see who (ID) is receiving messages. Apps like 0xchat and Amethyst use NIP-17 to implement DM functionalities. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” In Keychat, the ID, encryption key, receiving address, and sending address are separated. The encryption key, the receiving address, and the sending address are updated independently and continuously. Keychat's encryption key is derived using the Signal protocol, and each message uses a unique encryption key, which is deleted after use. Thus, Keychat messages have both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Even if an encryption key is compromised, only the current message can be leaked, and historical and future messages remain secure. Keychat's sending address is randomly generated for each message. Therefore, external parties do not know the sender's ID. Keychat's receiving address is derived using the Signal protocol, with almost every message using a unique receiving address. Thus, external parties do not know the receiver's ID. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” However, it's important to emphasize that NIP-4 and NIP-17 offer superior multi-device synchronization capabilities because they integrate three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address.
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๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ
โ†ฉ replying to แด›สœแด‡ แด…แด‡แด€แด›สœ แด๊œฐ แดสŸแด‡แด‹แดœ
well, so it is all understood anyway... for now it's only used in relay code but having a comprehensive kind library means including these others, 14, 13, which don't appear as events on the wire but content of wire events oh yes, if the relay is to be able to implement a chatbot such as for managing and alerts regarding subscriptions it does need to have the ability to parse them in the manner of a client
๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ
gift wrap your dm's (NIP-17)
Keychat's avatar Keychat
Old Nostr DM (NIP-4) integrates four capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, a receiving address, and a sending address. The encryption key in NIP-4 does not change, so NIP-4 messages lack both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Consequently, if the private key is compromised, both historical and future messages can be exposed. The receiving and sending addresses remain constant, which poses a severe issue for metadata privacy in NIP-4 messages; Everyone can see who (ID) is sending messages to whom (ID). Currently, most Nostr apps use NIP-4 for DM functionalities, such as Damus and Primal. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” New Nostr DM (NIP-17) integrates three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address. Kind-17 separates the sending address from the ID, making the sending address random and concealing the sender's real ID, thus improving metadata privacy. The encryption key in NIP-17 does not change, so NIP-17 messages also lack forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Once the private key is leaked, both historical and future messages will be compromised. The receiving address remains constant, so there is still a slight issue with metadata privacy in NIP-17 messages; everyone can see who (ID) is receiving messages. Apps like 0xchat and Amethyst use NIP-17 to implement DM functionalities. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” In Keychat, the ID, encryption key, receiving address, and sending address are separated. The encryption key, the receiving address, and the sending address are updated independently and continuously. Keychat's encryption key is derived using the Signal protocol, and each message uses a unique encryption key, which is deleted after use. Thus, Keychat messages have both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Even if an encryption key is compromised, only the current message can be leaked, and historical and future messages remain secure. Keychat's sending address is randomly generated for each message. Therefore, external parties do not know the sender's ID. Keychat's receiving address is derived using the Signal protocol, with almost every message using a unique receiving address. Thus, external parties do not know the receiver's ID. โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” However, it's important to emphasize that NIP-4 and NIP-17 offer superior multi-device synchronization capabilities because they integrate three capabilities into a single Nostr keyโ€”it serves as an ID, an encryption key, and a receiving address.
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