Thread

@Super Testnet @Arkad @npub1nccw...z7mj

I think we need a comment from the devs on this isssue directly @npub15c88...ssvx what do you think?

It says on their blog post that it's fixed.

Yeah but is there a way to verify that independently other than the trust me bro approach? I'm not capable but I'm sure plenty of people are

Ah I see, the OP is saying that it isn't in code. Guess we'll have to wait for public comment. I dont have the tech chops to verify either way, nor do I have any direct contact with anyone from Ashigaru.

but isn't that wording kind of weird? we're not concerned with the keys being sent to the client... we're concerned the *coordinator being able to link inputs/output, not the clients. it seems like theyre addressing a different issue there.

what I'm saying is that the blog post doesn't seem to be addressing that issue at all

Looks like he might be barking up the wrong tree. https://x.com/_k3tan/status/1937083188591161806

ie looking at the wrong code? thanks

Bug is in whirlpool and not the wallet.

No

Seems to be implied there, yes.

Seems like the terminal client has a hard coded key. Is the client using that to check that against the one sent from the coordinator? No match, no mix? http://ashicodepbnpvslzsl2bz7l2pwrjvajgumgac423pp3y2deprbnzz7id.onion/Ashigaru/Ashigaru-Terminal/src/branch/main/darkjar/src/main/resources/cipher/mainnet

Yes they have hardcoded a key in terminal. This introduces another vulnerability. I will add the details in the bitcointalk post.

its not a vulnerability if they're modulating the hardcoded key per CJ round correct? as @npub1vadc...nuu7 suggested on original vulnerability disclosure post Jan 7th? either way, the server CANNOT give clients a unique key for identification.

Precisely

trying to figure out if/how key modulation is happening its above my pay grade TBH 😅

That makes two of us

Can the Ashigaru Whirlpool coordinator de-anonymize users? I don't know but what I can say is that developing a trustless protocol/service is extremely hard, especially when your starting point is a trustful one.

Whirlpool is a ZeroLink implementation similar to Wasabi Wallet 1.x was and even when the protocol and the cryptography involved are simple, there are many chances to make mistakes. During the early days Wasabi team introduced bugs using RSA and then using Schnorr, for example. This is something to celebrate anyway as we need more privacy tools and because it was sad to witness the level of cowardy raining in the environment while a bunch of "purists" attacked all privacy tools as if they were able to do it better.

At your feet, @npub1nccw...z7mj . I feel a great sadness witnessing developers and users spending their valuable energy pointing out flaws, while very little is directed towards reconizing the effort and goals of #Ashigaru (that are also ours as user community). Thank you once again for dedicating your valuable time to reply and provide context to this uproar.

Any info as to why it's false?

afaict its false because they have hardcoded a key into the client. therefore the server cant assign different RSA keys to different clients to map their inputs/outputs. fd0 was premature in thinking the vulnerability hasnt been addressed.

New ashigaru whirlpool coordinator can de-anonymize users

New ashigaru whirlpool coordinator can de-anonymize users