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This is a tablet PC with Cellebrite UFED, a mobile forensics acquisition software. Users plug a target device into it where it then will attempt to extract as much data on the device as possible. The software on the laptop is Physical Analyser which is for forensic analysis. This video is dated, and Cellebrite UFED's UI, logo and capabilities have changed a lot since the video was released. This tool is also not exclusive to UK law enforcement and there are also competitor solutions, which many countries around the world use plus the competitors. Cellebrite sell a variant of this product named Cellebrite Premium. The difference to standard UFED and Premium is that Premium comes with wider device extraction support through zero-day exploits. As described it also allows extraction of vulnerable devices that are locked. This business model is not exclusive. XRY Pro (MSAB) and GrayKey (Magnet Forensics) are other exclusive forensic tools. Cellebrite are the second-oldest of the three companies (on joining the forensics market) but are one of the most capable thanks to their funding and location. How and if these tools are able to extract your device's data depends on: - The device you are using - The installed OS and version - The lock state of the device - Configured security settings of the device - Strength of your phone's unlock credential For a locked device exploiting security vulnerabilities is required to extract data almost all of the time. There are two different device lock states on Android and iOS: After first unlock (AFU, Hot) and before first unlock (BFU, Cold). This is due to how encryption works. Modern Android and iOS encrypt all users' data by default with keys derived from the user's credentials. When a device is unlocked once, data is no longer encrypted at rest and is accessible during that boot session. When a device is BFU, all sensitive data is at rest. Data not being at rest provides more OS attack surface to exploit bypassing lock screens or other measures and access to the data without needing the original PIN/password to decrypt it. For BFU devices brute forcing is required to decrypt data first and the only data not encrypted is a minimal footprint of the OS used for unlocking the device and global OS configuration and metadata. To make extraction impossible make sure your device is powered off and you use a secure, high-entropy passphrase before seizure. GrapheneOS provides a configurable, automatic inactivity reboot feature. We also provide several other countermeasures to these tools as well. GrapheneOS locked devices as a whole is unsupported by Cellebrite. If you are an opposition activist in a high-risk country you should be concerned about potential attacks from such tools. They have been abused to target activists in numerous countries like Serbia and Jordan. Despite if a business claims this use of their product like this is unauthorised, it doesn't change the fact that they will be used like this again, that they don't know about it until after it has violated someone's rights and that the security vulnerabilities remain unpatched. GrapheneOS provides an auto-reboot to put data at rest, a USB-C port control to disable data transfer or the port entirely when booted into the OS, clearing sensitive data of memory and exploit protection features.
TFTC's avatar TFTC
British police can access your phone without a password or warrant. Device retrieves all messages, websites, deleted content, and everyone who's contacted you.
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The video is very old and most Android devices didn't use disk encryption by default, so a physical extraction (image of the entire flash storage) could allow recovering deleted files from carving unallocated space. Nowadays Android uses a "file-based encryption" (FBE) where all data is encrypted with separate derived keys for each file, directory and symbolic link. Deleting the file loses the keys and recovery is impossible. If you can recover data that is deleted from an app, it means the app is caching it when it shouldn't be and it's a flaw they would need to fix. I don't recall this being an issue with Signal but if you can extract the app data before the message database is rebuilt for deleted messages then you'd be in luck. You could kill an app and prevent it cleaning up it's DB. This is something you can apply to every messenger though. Getting this data requires as much as a full filesystem extraction (FFS) to extract the application /data directory where the message databases are. Cellebrite has no extraction support for GrapheneOS according to themselves. No specification on what the most they can extract from an unlocked device is, but assume that all forensic tools get this data anyway. Molly lets you encrypt the message database with a passphrase, so it wouldn't be accessible regardless of if there was a FFS extraction and a flaw in Signal keeping the messages.
also worth mentioning FBE is a big plus compared to Full Disk Encryption (FDE) which was the legacy Android encryption and the encryption desktop OSes like Windows and Linux use. If you have the keys to decrypt the disk then it would be possible to decrypt the unallocated space in FDE since it's all one key, so you'd be relying on TRIM if you are using an SSD to prevent recovery of deleted data.
>What are you currently identifying as Graphene's weak spots? From a security standpoint, the Linux kernel is a liability. Most patches are upstream Linux kernel security bugs. It's a large attack surface. Android distributions also don't patch the kernel completely unlike us where we push the latest GKI per update. Our Linux hardening work can be made redundant if it was replaced with a something more designed for security like a microkernel. From a user experience, the default apps aren't great with exception to our own apps like Vanadium, Camera etc. These are AOSP apps. New apps made in Kotlin with the modern Material 3 Expressive UIs are needed. Would also need the same licensing as AOSP does. >What about the underlying reliance on proprietary hardware? Always will be a thing for any device you are using. You can't guarantee designs match the product nor are you TSMC making your own processors with billion dollar manufacturing plants. Even the "free" "open" devices the FSF like to promote aren't truly open, they just have entirely proprietary hardware with embedded firmware so they do not allow the user to update in the OS. Linux-Libre blocked alerts for CPU vulns like Meltdown and Spectre (can be exploited remotely) and the distros don't usually deliver microcode to patch that either. >How do you perceive the future and how can we contribute to funding it? We are still continuing the partnership with our OEM. We hope to have devices by the next year as their 2026 Qualcomm devices missed deploying ARMv9 security features (iirc, would need to check with another team member). The OEM should make a formal announcement in the not so late future. A lot of usability and accessibility improvements are on the way, and it would be nice to have better default apps in time for more supported devices in 2027. We are trying to hire devs and want to expand. Funding wise we still rely on donations, but fortunately we get regular donations and are well resourced. People and talent is important.
Great read! PSA ⚠️ It's important to note that we have it from credible sources, merely *having* GrapheneOS is a red flag against you in the Palantir and associated software. They don't care what you do, who you are, so long as the system flags you as a Graphene User. 🧾The reason is explained pretty well in this post. For your own safety: decide what's more important. ⚠️ your Life or your Data ⚠️ Then choose. If it's your Data, GrapheneOS and similar are essential #FreedomTech But if you're a Journalist, Activist, or worse, Humanitarian worker, remember that the lack of evidence, *will* be taken as evidence against you, as we have seen from our network in Ecuador, France and more. In which case, keeping a burner/burner-ish phone with fake everything (faux email, faux social platforms, faux SIM, etc) is better to preserve your life. #TheMoreYouKnow the better you can decide. #ZionistCancer #SurveillanceState #PrivacyRefuge View quoted note β†’