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Amethyst's new DM model will allow users to backup their outgoing DMs to a separate Nostr pubkey. If somebody gets access to the main key, they won't be able to find or even count your outgoing messages. That will create a new class of micro apps to manage DM backup and recovery. To recover DMs, the backup client re-signs all past messages to a new key your main client just created. If you have two or three clients, you can use 2-3 DM keys. The backup client can keep forwarding your own backed-up DMs to 2-3 other keys so that all clients can sync and see the same messages. There are lots of interesting features of this model. The most important one is that when re-signing, the date/time of the original message doesn't need to be shown. The backup client re-signs everything as of today. The public doesn't know these are DMs and doesn't even know if the public date is relevant or not. Want to know more? Here: 📃.md

Replies (13)

I was wondering if there is any kind of encryption involved regarding DM at the moment? Can someone with the npub request all DM of a person from a relay or am I missing something?
↩ replying to Wayne
Because ideas with aliases and other shared key protocols require you to trust the counterparty you are talking with. They can leak all your conversation at any point without leaking their private key. There were many proposals, but they all require some level of trust in the counterparty or in a private relay operator, for instance. This one does not. You can talk to your worse enemy and they won't be able to expose you unless they expose themselves as well (leak their main account's private keys).
↩ replying to Disturbia
1. You are going to need to design something as complicated as this on the new protocol if you want to provide the same privacy guarantees at the same comfort level (device syncing, etc) 2. Designing a protocol just for private messages is WORSE than doing private messages inside a system that can transfer anything privately. The anonymity set of the new protocol is just worse. 3. The other protocol doesn't exist. This one does :)
Another cool feature of this system is that you don't need to trust the counter party or the group you are talking with. They cannot expose your messages without significantly exposing themselves (leaking their main account's private key). In many other proposals, all an unsatisfied person has to do is to expose the conversation's shared secret and boom, everyone can see and verify your messages. And they can leak that secret anonymously, without any damage to themselves. View quoted note →