Joe Resident

Can't believe how good Gemini 3 Flash is for the price 2.5 Flash was already my favorite coding AI, so happy

this goes way too hard Can you imagine if they actually started a contest where the auctioneers have to auction to a beat oof Auctioneer Contest with Autotune

SAM3 make it super easy to make a 3D model by clicking on an object in a picture. Super cool, using it to make plant models for a garden simulation. demo:

Meta AI Demos

Segment Anything Playground | Meta

A playground for interactive media

Social media being more important than the moment is cringe Unless it IS the moment, in which case it could either be fine, or doubly cringe

note1stz7fh966flulf9vt8550k6nl0kljdzzh388gls97g052lek8pss2ucnat Re: incentivizing intelligence agencies to release more information. I asked GPT-5 to speculate, pretty impressed: prompt: "speculate about an incentive structure within the agencies that rewards them for making as much information public as possible. Now they optimize only for global strategic advantage and self-preservation, what if structurally we added releasing information as a third motivation?" ChatGPT said: That’s a fascinating inversion of the current design. Right now, as you say, U.S. intelligence agencies are structured to optimize for (1) national strategic advantage and (2) bureaucratic self-preservation. Secrecy serves both: it protects sources/methods and shields the agency from criticism or oversight. Adding a third structural incentive: “maximize responsible public disclosure” would fundamentally reshape their internal incentive calculus. Let me speculate on how such a system might work. 1. Why Secrecy is the Default Incentive Risk asymmetry: If you over-classify, there’s rarely a penalty; if you under-classify and something leaks or goes wrong, it can end careers. Budget politics: Bigger “black box” operations make it harder for outsiders to challenge budgets. Classified = harder to contest. Cultural prestige: Within the agencies, being “read into” highly secret programs is status. More secrecy = more power, more exclusivity. These pressures mean that secrecy is the dominant strategy under the current incentive structure. 2. Hypothetical: Building in “Disclosure Rewards” Imagine Congress, the executive, or independent oversight creates a third metric: value of responsible public transparency. The agency and its personnel are rewarded when information is released to the public (without harming ongoing operations). Possible structural levers: Budgetary incentives: A percentage of agency budget is tied to a “Disclosure Index.” Agencies that responsibly declassify and release more information get higher discretionary funding. Career incentives: Promotions and awards explicitly tied to quality and quantity of responsible disclosures (e.g. “analyst of the year” for producing intelligence assessments later released with minimal redactions). Reputational capital: Agencies score “public trust points” tracked by oversight boards, affecting leadership bonuses, leadership tenure, or even how much autonomy Congress grants them. Competition between agencies: If CIA, NSA, DIA, etc. are benchmarked against each other for transparency, the “prestige” dynamic flips—leaders want to be seen as the most open without compromising security. 3. What Changes in Behavior? Classification standards shift: Default might move from “classify unless clear it’s harmless” → “release unless clear it’s harmful.” Proactive declassification pipelines: Dedicated offices constantly preparing sanitized versions of reports for public release, with incentives to do it quickly. Strategic openness as a weapon: Agencies might deliberately release certain intel analyses not only to reassure the public but also to shape foreign adversaries’ behavior (e.g., exposing corruption networks, publishing satellite evidence). Public engagement loop: Agencies could become knowledge-brokers to the citizenry, publishing historical case studies, trend reports, and sanitized operational lessons, thereby turning intelligence into a “national commons” resource as much as a secret tool. 4. Potential Benefits Trust repair: Citizens see intelligence as working for them, not over them. Policy legitimacy: Elected officials can point to intelligence disclosures as grounds for decisions, reducing suspicion that policy is being driven by a “shadow state.” Deterrence by transparency: Publishing adversary misdeeds (e.g. disinformation ops) can weaken rivals without kinetic action. Innovation spillover: Releasing sanitized technical methods (cryptography, satellite imaging, AI analysis) accelerates civilian science/industry. 5. Potential Risks Over-disclosure arms adversaries: Too much revealed, too soon, can compromise capabilities. Agencies might game the incentive by releasing irrelevant or already-known material. Perverse incentives: Leaders may push to “pad” transparency stats with low-value data dumps rather than meaningful releases. Short-termism: Drive to disclose could bias against long-term clandestine projects where secrecy is crucial. Weaponization of disclosure metrics: Rival political parties could pressure agencies to release intelligence favorable to their narratives.

note1stz7fh966flulf9vt8550k6nl0kljdzzh388gls97g052lek8pss2ucnat 4. If the US didn't become a global superpower, maybe it wouldn't be acting out the self-preservation instinct in such questionable ways. Maybe this always happens to empires. Maybe they get paranoid.