Thread
The exploit works because Core neglected to update the spam filters a few years ago, and refuses to fix the vulnerability.
And no, you're wrong. Satoshi's spam filters were VERY picky about what was inside transactions. Anything that he didn't foresee being used was rejected.
Core30's malicious changes have nothing whatsoever to do with Taproot.
Each user decides for himself. Collectively, our nodes form consensus around what is spam and what maybe isn't.
Replies (1)
If Core neglected to update spam filters and refuses to fix the vulnerability, that sounds like the Core development consensus chose not to restrict it. Whether through action or inaction, that became Bitcoin’s reality post Taproot.
On Satoshi’s filters: can you point to specific examples where Satoshi rejected transactions based on content type rather than structural validity? I want to understand the historical precedent you’re citing.
On Core 30 and Taproot: if they’re unrelated, what specifically is Core 30 changing that enables the threat you’re warning about?
On “each user decides” agreed. But there’s a difference between individual nodes filtering their own mempools versus advocating that filtering should be the standard. Your post isn’t just “here’s what I’m doing”, it’s “everyone should do this NOW.” That’s attempting to establish collective filtering as the norm, not individual choice.
