History shouldn’t be judged by hindsight; strategy must be judged ex ante — see my new essay on Vietnam and U.S. grand strategy, 1955–65. This essay grew out of a recent exchange about Vietnam, American grand strategy, and how we judge historical decisions. Too often debates about wars collapse into hindsight: “it was unnecessary” or “it worked” — both argued from the same outcomes. My point is that serious study of strategy must judge decisions ex ante, by what leaders knew and feared at the time, not by what we know now. Vietnam (1955–1965) is a living example. Whatever we think of the outcome, U.S. political, military, and foreign policy leaders largely agreed on the ends. The debates were about ways and means under uncertainty, with lessons from Munich, World War II, and Korea in mind. The result is this essay: “Judging Strategy Ex Ante: Vietnam, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the Lessons of Context (1955–1965).” It sets out eight principles for analyzing strategy that I think apply as much to today’s world as to the Cold War. View Article →

Strategy isn’t chemistry in a lab. Leaders make choices in real time, with prior beliefs, knowledge and background, fears, and messy constraints. Hindsight proves nothing. Eight principles for thinking straight about strategy: 1. Ex ante, not hindsight. 2. Ends–Ways–Means under uncertainty. 3. Hierarchy of ends (local → global). 4. Priors matter. 5. All sides have agency. 6. Least-bad options. 7. Synchronic + diachronic context. 8. Reasonable under the circumstances. Strategic history’s value is not in proving what should have happened, but in understanding how leaders thought and why they chose as they did.

Sovereign restraint is the discipline of universality: sovereignty must remain thin, general, and neutral, leaving the space of particularity to parasovereign orders. Where sovereigns enforce religion, sex, ideology, or lifestyle, they collapse into factional capture. Where sovereignty restrains itself, it becomes durable, while parasovereignty supplies the diversity and richness of human life. Sovereignty without restraint is brittle. Sovereignty with restraint is stable.

"The aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed." Carl von Clausewitz, On War

War, what is it good for? Absolutely nothing, huh! Except when a country attacks. Are you just supposed to lie down and take it?