CONCEPTUAL ERROR: COMBINING TRACEABLE AND NON-TRACEABLE OPERATIONS
You don't need to be a developer to understand the idea: you can't mix a TRACEABLE transaction with a NON-TRACEABLE one because the data and metadata will leave a huge vulnerability for privacy.
It's the same as when you buy XMR on a CEX with KYC and then send it to your non-custodial wallet. Even though the Monero blockchain has a strong native privacy protocol, your funds have a very clear previous trail, even if it is later lost. Data and metadata remain on that trail: access logs, IP, withdrawal amount, and transaction hash, linked to your identity.
Imagine you walk into a store full of cameras (the CEX) and buy an anonymity mask (Monero) using your personal credit card (KYC).
The problem:
Even though the mask works perfectly and no one can recognize you once you put it on in the street (Monero Blockchain), the store has a record that you bought that specific mask.
The consequence:
If someone investigates the store's records, they will know that you have the mask. They cannot see what you do with it afterwards (future privacy), but they already know that you have it and how much you paid for it (the initial trace). Anonymity is not retroactive.
Here's an example, now with technical details ππ»
ZachXBT exposes a privacy vulnerability in Zashi's integration with Near Intents for Zcash, where refunds to transparent addresses link shielded funds with unshielded funds, allowing de-anonymization by matching amounts and times.

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1/ As part of my work I like to test out privacy products and figure out what works and what doesnβt so I can abuse any design flaws for my inves...