There's someone flooding all JoinMarket makers with !orderbook requests. Making them run out of storage with several GBs of logs per hour and also filling their CPU cycles. It does so through direct onion connections (last time was through directories) and with a bunch of nicks in parallel. I've implemented Tor level DDoS protection through a dynamic PoW requirement (0 in normal cases) in a branch of jm-ng as an experiment:

GitHub

feat: Add Tor PoW DoS defense for hidden services by m0wer · Pull Request #108 · m0wer/joinmarket-ng

JoinMarket (Bitcoin CoinJoin) modern alternative implementation - feat: Add Tor PoW DoS defense for hidden services by m0wer · Pull Request #108 �...

It only works with the alpha release of Tor, but an expected release might come soon. I didn't know about this feature from Tor, but it's really neat. Some more info here:

Tor Project | Onion service DoS guidelines

Defend yourself against tracking and surveillance. Circumvent censorship. | Onion service DoS guidelines

#JoinMarketNG #JoinMarket #CoinJoin

About the problem of deleting notes on Nostr, here's an idea: use a delegated key that rotates each month and expires. Once expired, request deletion from all your notes from all relays and then share the private key so that anyone can post bullshit with it, including yourself. You get plausible deniability for anything posted before last month and really encourage relays to delete all shit signed with that expired delegated key or they will get spammed to death. This might be a stupid idea. Please go ahead and let me know why.

Fixed my zap receiving ability by switching to Coinos. Will leave the fight of getting my self hosted lnbits working fast enough for later.