No bro you don't get it you just gotta do this key combination and type this random shit in

#GrapheneOS version 2025112100 released. • fix regression from our Android 16 QPR1 port causing enabling the Network permission to not work without a reboot • adevtool: fix SELinux policy handling issue causing fingerprint registration issues on the devices with power button fingerprint readers (Pixel Tablet, Pixel Fold, Pixel 9 Pro Fold) with Android QPR1 • fix port of our notification forwarding between user profiles feature to Android 16 QPR1 • enable new UI customization picker UI from Android 16 QPR1 • Wallpaper Picker: don't use the CuratedPhotos categories which aren't setup in AOSP • Wallpaper Picker: hide the always-empty wallpaper carousel • Wallpaper Picker: enable integration of the embedded photo picker • System Updater, Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer: switch to Material 3 Expressive theme for Settings app menus • Cell Broadcast Receiver: fix presidential alerts toggle added by GrapheneOS not being enabled without the main emergency alerts toggle being toggled off and on • Vanadium: update to version 142.0.7444.171.0 All of the Android 16 security patches from the current December 2025, January 2026, February 2026 and March 2026 Android Security Bulletins are included in the 2025112101 security preview release. List of additional fixed CVEs: • Critical: CVE-2025-48631, CVE-2026-0006 • High: CVE-2022-25836, CVE-2022-25837, CVE-2023-40130, CVE-2025-22420, CVE-2025-22432, CVE-2025-26447, CVE-2025-32319, CVE-2025-32348, CVE-2025-48525, CVE-2025-48536, CVE-2025-48555, CVE-2025-48564, CVE-2025-48565, CVE-2025-48566, CVE-2025-48567, CVE-2025-48572, CVE-2025-48573, CVE-2025-48574, CVE-2025-48575, CVE-2025-48576, CVE-2025-48577, CVE-2025-48578, CVE-2025-48579, CVE-2025-48580, CVE-2025-48582, CVE-2025-48583, CVE-2025-48584, CVE-2025-48585, CVE-2025-48586, CVE-2025-48587, CVE-2025-48589, CVE-2025-48590, CVE-2025-48592, CVE-2025-48594, CVE-2025-48596, CVE-2025-48597, CVE-2025-48598, CVE-2025-48600, CVE-2025-48601, CVE-2025-48602, CVE-2025-48603, CVE-2025-48604, CVE-2025-48605, CVE-2025-48609, CVE-2025-48612, CVE-2025-48614, CVE-2025-48615, CVE-2025-48616, CVE-2025-48617, CVE-2025-48618, CVE-2025-48619, CVE-2025-48620, CVE-2025-48621, CVE-2025-48622, CVE-2025-48626, CVE-2025-48628, CVE-2025-48629, CVE-2025-48630, CVE-2025-48632, CVE-2025-48633, CVE-2025-48634, CVE-2026-0005, CVE-2026-0007, CVE-2026-0008 2025112101 provides at least the full 2025-12-01 Android and Pixel security patch level but will remain marked as providing 2025-11-05.

Releases | GrapheneOS

Interview of French federal prosecutor saying that not providing them with backdoors is unacceptable and they'll go after us with charges if we don't cooperate with them: archive.is/UrlvK There's a very direct threat towards us in that article. They've made it clear they do not consider it acceptable for there to be devices they cannot break into. In that interview, there's a clear statement they'll go after us as they did others if we don't "cooperate" with them. The demands they have from us are unspecified but we're not going to wait around to find out what they expect from us. #GrapheneOS will exit remaining global infrastructure in France and OVH as soon as possible. We do not feel safe operating in a country with federal law enforcement agencies lying about us and threatening us. France's government is a strong supporter of backdoors for secure messaging apps including heavily supporting Chat Control. They appear to have the same position on secure devices. Their previous law enforcement action against both was done based on claims of ties to criminals. In some of the cases, it was clear the companies were tied to criminals. One of those companies was an FBI sting operation from early on which was advertising itself as being based on GrapheneOS. Maybe some of the ones they're conflating with us are also sting operations too. They're conflating shady companies selling products they say are based on GrapheneOS with us. ANOM was a sting operation by the FBI paying criminals to sell phones to criminals while advertising it as being based on GrapheneOS. Since when is the FBI facilitating crimes in France our fault?

Have you been noticing? It happens: When we succeed despite shortcomings, When we just released a major update, When we are working on more devices, When we get patches early, When new leaks confirm we protect users, When we are the first, or the only, to do it, and much more... Tyrants are threatened when you defend yourself against their invasive control and oppression. Keep paying attention. View quoted note →

Here's another French journalist participating in fearmongering about GrapheneOS. That article is not measured. It provided a platform to make both unsubstantiated and provably false claims about GrapheneOS while providing no opportunity to see and respond to those claims.

Bluesky Social

Gabriel Thierry (@gabrielthierry.bsky.social)

Un point qui devrait alerter. Je trouve l'article du @leparisien.fr mesuré: il signale les craintes policières d'une dérive vers un usage crimin...

The claims the article platforms are conflating closed source products from European companies infringing on our copyright and trademarks with GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS doesn't have the features they claim it does, isn't distributed in the ways they claim and they don't understand open source software. GrapheneOS is obtained from

Web installer | Install | GrapheneOS

and

Releases | GrapheneOS

. There are a bunch of legitimate companies in Europe selling devices with real GrapheneOS including NitroKey. We aren't partnered with those companies and don't get funding from it but there's nothing shady about it. Products using operating systems partially based on our code are not GrapheneOS. There's no such thing as a fake Snapchat app wiping the device in GrapheneOS. It has no remote management or remote wiping built into it. It does not have a subscription fee / licensing system built into it either. Vast majority of the code for those products comes from elsewhere: Android Open Source Project, Linux kernel, Chromium, LLVM and other projects. Of course the non-profit open source project writing a small portion of the code being used by those companies being targeted rather than IBM, Google, etc. Both Android and iOS try to defend users from the same attack vectors we do. We developed far better protections against exploits which we release as open source code. Open source means anyone can freely use it for any purpose, exactly like the Android Open Source Project used by GrapheneOS itself. Open source is why we can build GrapheneOS based on the Android Open Source Project. It doesn't make Linus Torvalds, IBM, Google, etc. responsible for what we do. Similarly, others can make their own software based on GrapheneOS. A fork of GrapheneOS contains a small portion of code written by us. France supposedly has a right to reply which we intend to exercise to respond at length to these articles containing libel from the French state. We're going to be ending the small amount of operations we have in France as we don't feel the country is safe for open source privacy projects anymore. GrapheneOS doesn't host services storing sensitive user data. We have signature verification and downgrade protection for updates to the OS, apps and app store metadata. We're going move our website and discussion server away from OVH. Our update mirrors and authoritative DNS are already elsewhere. Our discussion forum, Matrix, Mastodon, etc. in OVH Bearharnois can be moved to local or colocated servers in Toronto instead. We can use Netcup (owned by Anexia, both German) as one of the main providers for website/network service instances. The majority of our servers are already not on OVH. We won't travel to France including avoiding conferences and will avoid having people working in the country too. A simple heuristic for the EU is avoiding countries supporting Chat Control. We genuinely believe we cannot safely operate in France anymore as an open source project privacy project. Our pinned post on this platform shows a great example of why they're actually upset with us:

X (formerly Twitter)

GrapheneOS (@GrapheneOS) on X

In April 2024, Pixels shipped a partial implementation of our January 2024 proposal for firmware-based reset attack protection. Fastboot mode now z...

It almost makes us willing to contribute to AOSP again to try to wipe out their ability to exploit a subset of unon-GrapheneOS Android devices too. Google is welcome to reach out.

If you see me fucking around at a conference soon, no you didn't 🫡

If I wasn't GrapheneOS maxi before then I am now. Fucking love these guys.