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> Is that difficult? Yes, for most people. Manipulating configuration files requires a lot of background knowledge that most people don't have. Using command line arguments too. You also neglected the part about installing linux in the first place, and then installing tor. For most people, I suspect they would assume "installing tor" means "installing the tor browser," not running "pkg install tor" or "sudo apt install tor" or whatever it is since it depends on which linux operating system you're using. And if someone gets past all that, then you have to somehow find out that (1) you have to keep it running (2) the port switches from 9050 to 9150 if you're using tor browser -- and if you're on Windows, everything is different there too. So yeah, it's difficult. Not for me or you, but we've got a lot of background knowledge that you can't assume for most people. > Making a new wallet per transaction is schizo IMO Yet -- according to the monero website -- that's the only way to get transaction unlinkability in monero. You think *lightning* has a UX problem? Meet monero. > your criticisms about having to make new addresses and the like are all REQUIREMENTS for bitcoin on-chain even to the same vendor. You can reuse the same address with the same person with Monero's and there will be no on-chain link There will be no "on-chain" link, but that person will have an off-chain link that is just as provable. An identical thing is true for monero's addresses and bitcoin's xpubs: if you trust the sender with your privacy, you can give him a monero address or a bitcoin xpub (or a bitcoin SP address, more recently) and if he reuses it, then "on-chain" there will be no link between different transactions sent by that person. Unless the sender makes mistakes too. But even if he does everything *else* perfectly, he made this mistake: he kept your address or xpub and reused it -- and that means he kept a record or proof that links multiple transactions together. If the address or xpub leaks to untrustworthy people, e.g. if he is subpoena'd for that information, your adversaries learn those links and can prove them in court. I think that's a terrible for privacy. Do you? Or is it only bad when it applies to bitcoin, and perfectly fine in the case of monero? > Please do proper journalism by using the protocol you describe I've used monero plenty and I think it sucks.

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Alright I got major counterarguments to your points here but can't outline them in detail 'til after work so I'll be back. In summary: adding Tor to your Monero node is optional because of dandelion++ but is absolutely required with Bitcoind or the like because it doesn't have a dandelion implementation to fluff transactions. To add the Tor proxy its just as trivial for both daemons thus isn't any harder for Monero. The official Monero GUI has a check for socks proxy too so you can't get much simpler than that. Bitcoin core has the same but once again, it's required for Bitcoin due to no dandelion stem. For your big point regarding address reuse even the most ideal cryptographic solution for privacy will always be compromised if an attacker, like a state agency who subpoenas, gets the private key. Not a gotcha, every single cryptographic system has this vulnerability: PGP, Tor, SimpleX, Signal you name it. If its decrypted on the device, then the adversary has the plaintext if they have access to the device or private keys, simple as. Monero is way simpler than setting up LND. I can tell you've not used Monero because you refuse to concede this point. I've set up a public monero node via systemd, set up Retoswap, set up p2pool recently with xmrig, the latter being the most difficult. Each of these way simpler than learning how lightning channel liquidity works and using the embedded LND node on Zeus. This difficulty went through the roof when setting up LND via CLI. Tor is often preinstalled on most Linux distros and often is enabled via systemd. Port doesn't switch from 9050 to 9150 that's why they're separate. The Tor browser creates a whole separate Tor process than the daemon version that uses 9050 by default. Almost all distros use systemd so once For is enabled it will restart itself if it crashes or when OS is restarted. Its set and forget. This error of yours betrays your inexperience in Tor routing. Everything's always more difficult on Windows. Not a Monero gotcha, Bitcoin has the very same UX hurdles (worse since you absolutely need Tor to protect your IP when broadcasting transactions from bitcoind due to lack of dandelion++) Cake wallet mobile + random remote node gets you similar or easier UX and way better privacy than Phoenix, Zeus LSP, Spark WoS or other custodial solutions. Cake Wallet plus your own node, or MoneroGUI with a local node is way easier than running your own LND behind Tor while offering superior network level privacy AND better on-chain privacy with greater security due to being on chain. You don't need to worry about watchtowers, force closes, etc.