Thread

image So why did Luke Dashjr say "Hashrate is irrelevant at this point"? I won't pretend to know what his opinion is, I'll just give you mine. 1) Mining isn't decentralized β€” pools are (allegedly, not really). Why are pools not decentralized? Because the interests of "rival" countries converge more often than most realize (More context: https://controlplanecapital.com/p/rivalry-between-countries-is-curated ). Hashrate aggregates into ~5–7 top pools; 2–3 could cross 51% at times. Miners "vote with feet", but: - Payout variance pushes them to big pools. - Pools integrate with regulated fiat ramps and insurers; they may adopt OFAC/blacklist templates to avoid headaches. Template power: Pools select transactions. If major pools adopt "policy clients" (e.g., template filters, blacklists), settlement becomes steerable β€” even if blocks remain valid under consensus. So what? Incentives favor pool compliance with state policy β€” especially when insurance, utilities, and public listings are involved. 2) Hardware & energy are choke-points (supply-chain centralization) - ASIC oligopoly. 2–3 manufacturers dominate. Firmware signing, remote management, and replacement cycles create vendor leverage. - Jurisdictional energy. Large industrial miners rely on permits, grid interconnects, subsidies. In a low Gross Consent Product environment, regulators swap "ideals" for "stability" β€” conditional access > rights. - Policy carrot/stick: cheap power for curtailment agreements, transaction policies, ESG attestations; penalties for non-compliant operators. So what? If you need the grid and the power plant, the power plant owns you, and guess who owns the power plant. I have just described the current state of mining "decentralization". Of course this could improve/worsen in the future. Unless mining decentralization improves significantly, increasing hashrate is irrelevant at this point.

Replies (6)

To be fair, I think he’s referring to the issue with Core 30. The mining pool centralization problem is already solved with Datum - it just needs much wider adoption. Core 30 is an entirely different issue. BIP-444 could be a potential solution, but it remains to be seen whether a USAF will gain enough traction and support to make it happen. If it does, I’ll be more bullish than ever.
Could be, it is not very relevant what he is referring to, I just analyzed the message. Core 30 opens up major attack vectors as well. But to say "the mining pool centralization problem is already solved with Datum - it just needs much wider adoption", is like saying "the MoE problem is already solved with Bitcoin/Monero - you just have to get people to use them". Inside OCEAN, DATUM is now the default; network-wide it's still ~1% or less. OCEAN is only about ~1% of total Bitcoin hashrate (order of magnitude; varies over time). If ~65–94% of OCEAN’s hashrate is on DATUM, that implies ~0.6–0.9% of the network hashrate is mining with DATUM today. Stratum V2 is available at Braiins Pool and OCEAN/DEMAND’s pool, plus scattered tests elsewhere, but network adoption remains ~1% of hashrate or below. So mining pool centralization isn't a solved problem for now. Solvable problem, but not solved.
BTW, there's a reason less than 2% run protocols in which miners, not pools, decide which transactions get added to the blockchain. The Controllers kind of have the miners by the balls. Steering can come from: - Energy & permitting (Power contracts, Carbon accounting credits, Zoning / environmental sign-off), - Banking access, Insurance, Capex financing, - ASIC supply choke: export licenses/customs enforcement prioritize shipments to "certified" operators, - Relay & mempool policy, - Safe-harbor statutes (if you run a certified policy client, you're presumed compliant. If you don't, you own the legal risk), - Reporting/KYC on pool payouts: force miners into KYC'd payout rails; non-KYC payouts trigger Suspicious Activity Reports and audits, - Tax policy: extra depreciation/credits for compliant miners; audits for the rest. And these are just a few of the choke-points. So Bitcoin mining is a tough gig.
I think what Luke is referring to as a weakness is the insider attack vector. Developers with misaligned fiat incentives. Hashrate doesn't protect against bad code/policy decisions. It also doesn't protect against the attack vector enabled by said code/policy decisions. It's not a technical attack but a social attack. Bitcoin's immune system in this case is node runners not running the offensive code/policies.