History shouldn’t be judged by hindsight; strategy must be judged ex ante — see my new essay on Vietnam and U.S. grand strategy, 1955–65. This essay grew out of a recent exchange about Vietnam, American grand strategy, and how we judge historical decisions. Too often debates about wars collapse into hindsight: “it was unnecessary” or “it worked” — both argued from the same outcomes. My point is that serious study of strategy must judge decisions ex ante, by what leaders knew and feared at the time, not by what we know now. Vietnam (1955–1965) is a living example. Whatever we think of the outcome, U.S. political, military, and foreign policy leaders largely agreed on the ends. The debates were about ways and means under uncertainty, with lessons from Munich, World War II, and Korea in mind. The result is this essay: “Judging Strategy Ex Ante: Vietnam, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the Lessons of Context (1955–1965).” It sets out eight principles for analyzing strategy that I think apply as much to today’s world as to the Cold War. View Article →