As of May 17, 2025, Iran had amassed 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent developments, particularly U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, have raised concerns about the whereabouts of this stockpile. Here's a summary of what has happened based on available information:
U.S. Airstrikes (June 2025): On June 22, 2025, the U.S. conducted airstrikes, codenamed "Operation Midnight Hammer," targeting key Iranian nuclear sites, including Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. These strikes involved B-2 stealth bombers and Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs aimed at disrupting Iran's nuclear program.
Iran's Preemptive Relocation: Satellite imagery and intelligence reports indicate Iran moved significant amounts of its enriched uranium, including the 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium, before the strikes. Trucks were observed at Fordow and Isfahan days prior, suggesting Iran relocated the material to secret locations to protect it from the attacks. Israeli officials and the IAEA confirmed that equipment and uranium were transferred from Fordow, with evidence suggesting the stockpile at Isfahan was also moved.
Current Status: The exact location of the 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium is unknown. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted that UN inspectors last saw the stockpile a week before Israel’s attacks began on June 13, 2025, and the agency has been unable to verify its whereabouts since due to suspended inspections during the conflict. Iran claims its nuclear program remains intact and vows to continue enrichment, with officials stating the relocated uranium is secure.
Implications: The 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium is enough, if further enriched to 90%, to produce approximately 9–10 nuclear bombs. The relocation raises fears that Iran could enrich this material to weapons-grade levels at a covert facility, potentially within days or weeks using advanced centrifuges like the IR-6. However, analysts note that while Iran has the uranium, rebuilding damaged infrastructure (e.g., centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow) could take years, limiting its immediate ability to weaponize the material unless secret facilities exist.
IAEA Efforts: Grossi has urged Iran to allow inspectors back to account for the stockpile and ensure it hasn’t been diverted. Iran’s lack of cooperation and the suspension of inspections during wartime complicate verification efforts.
In summary, Iran likely moved its 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium to undisclosed locations before U.S. and Israeli strikes damaged its nuclear facilities. The material remains unaccounted for by the IAEA, raising concerns about its potential use, though Iran’s ability to weaponize it is constrained by damaged infrastructure. The situation remains unresolved, with ongoing diplomatic and intelligence efforts to locate and monitor the stockpile.



