I have build an AI-Mermaid-Chart-Generator and tried a difficult prompt (Palestine/Israel): The chart gives a walkthrough of events. I downloaded the SVG, made a PDF out of it, and gave it NotebookLM from Google, this is the result of the AI generated podcast https://notebooklm.google.com/notebook/75835e6c-7cdb-4d0d-bc5d-d98fbd1930bd/audio https://blossom.primal.net/e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
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NotebookLM is nice but the app is 100% vibe coded, horribly bad
Tomorrow I will add β€žpay with lightningβ€œ and nostr wallet connect. Flow chart generator and share and edit and fix Found those mermaid things very helpful in developing complex code bases. image
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flowchart TD %% USER DEVICE subgraph "User Device" direction TB DevPasskey["Built-in Device Passkey<br/>(Face ID / Touch ID)"]:::int WebAuthn["WebAuthn assertion<br/>(via external key OR device passkey)"]:::logic KeyShareA["Key Share A<br/>(AES-encrypted at rest,<br/>gated by Secure Enclave)"]:::secret FROSTSign["FROST MPC signing<br/>(runs in device RAM<br/>after user auth)"]:::compute EncA["Encrypted backup of<br/>Key Share A<br/>(iCloud/Google β€” passkey-encrypted, never plain)"]:::backup PasskeySync["Passkey backup<br/>(iCloud/Google)"]:::backup DevPasskey --> WebAuthn DevPasskey --> PasskeySync WebAuthn -->|unlock| KeyShareA KeyShareA -- "decrypted β†’ RAM" --> FROSTSign KeyShareA -. "passkey-encrypted<br/>export only" .-> EncA FROSTSign -- "Partial Sig A" --> Combine end %% EXTERNAL: hardware FIDO2 key for normal use HWKey["Hardware Security Key<br/>(FIDO2 token, USB/NFC)"]:::ext HWKey --> WebAuthn %% GUARDIAN / SOCIAL SHARE C (Shamir split, not passkey-encrypted) GuardianShareC["Guardian/Social Recovery<br/>Share C (Shamir split, not passkey-encrypted)"]:::secret EncC["Distributed guardian shares of C<br/>(print, cloud, trusted people)<br/>Collect quorum to reconstruct"]:::backup GuardianShareC -- "split and distribute (Shamir)" --> EncC EncC --> RecoveryTool %% OPTIONAL: hardware Bitcoin wallet full signing HWBtc["Hardware Bitcoin Wallet<br/>(Ledger/Trezor/BitBox)"]:::opt HWBtc -.-> Combine %% SERVER / TEE subgraph "Server / TEE (Nitro Enclave)" direction TB WebAuthnSrv["WebAuthn required<br/>to access"]:::logic ShareB["Key Share B<br/>(sealed inside TEE)"]:::secret EnclaveSign["Partial Sig B<br/>(FROST, runs inside TEE)"]:::compute WebAuthnSrv --> ShareB ShareB --> EnclaveSign EnclaveSign -- "Partial Sig B" --> Combine end %% THRESHOLD COMBINE & CHAIN Combine["Combine Partial Sig A + B<br/>(FROST threshold signature)"]:::combine Blockchain["Broadcast to Bitcoin network"]:::chain Confirmed["Confirmed transaction"]:::chain Combine --> Blockchain --> Confirmed %% SOCIAL RECOVERY (MANDATORY) EncA --> RecoveryTool RecoveryTool -. "reconstruct C<br/>(from guardian shares)" .-> Combine %% NOTE Note1["Threshold MPC β€” full key **never** exists in one place.<br/> Mobile share is passkey-gated; server share lives only in TEE.<br/> Guardian/social recovery shares (Share C) are split among trusted people and NOT passkey-encrypted β€” collect quorum for recovery.<br/> **Server must be present for any spending, recovery, or inheritance (as in Bitkey).**<br/> If either share is compromised, wallet cannot be drained.<br/> Optional hardware wallet can provide additional resilience.<br/> Test your backup and recovery regularly."]:::note Note1 --- Combine %% STYLES classDef ext fill:#dbeafe,stroke:#1e3a8a,stroke-width:2px classDef int fill:#dbeafe,stroke:#475569,stroke-width:2px classDef logic fill:#ffffff,stroke:#000000,stroke-width:2px classDef secret fill:#ffe4e6,stroke:#be123c,stroke-width:2px classDef compute fill:#fff7ed,stroke:#a16207,stroke-width:2px classDef backup fill:#fefce8,stroke:#92400e,stroke-width:2px classDef combine fill:#e2e8f0,stroke:#334155,stroke-width:2px classDef chain fill:#ecfccb,stroke:#15803d,stroke-width:2px classDef note fill:#fff3cd,stroke:#b38f00,stroke-width:2px classDef opt fill:#f5f3ff,stroke:#6366f1,stroke-width:2px,stroke-dasharray:5 5
sequenceDiagram actor User as User / Wallet UI participant SECURITYKEY as Biometric Hardware<br/>(FIDO2 authenticator) participant ENCLAVE as Secure Enclave<br/>Share A note right of ENCLAVE: Signing happens securely here,<br/>ensuring no RAM leak. participant HSM as Cloud HSM<br/>Share B participant BTC as Bitcoin Network %% ─── Spend flow ─── User->>SECURITYKEY: 1️⃣ WebAuthn β€œget assertion” (physical touch) SECURITYKEY-->>User: hmac-secret + signature User->>ENCLAVE: 2️⃣ Unlock Share A (using hmac-secret) ENCLAVE-->>User: Partial Signature A User->>HSM: 3️⃣ Sign request + Security Key assertion proof HSM-->>User: Partial Signature B User->>User: 4️⃣ Combine Sig A + Sig B (FROST threshold) User->>BTC: 5️⃣ Broadcast Taproot tx BTC-->>User: Tx confirmed Note over User,BTC: Full private key is **never reconstructed** Security Key touch and Biometrics is always required.
Not a bad way to reduce scams https://www.mastercard.com/global/en/personal/payment-passkeys.html