Bitcoin works because humanity as a whole creates the most value. The chain with the strongest economic incentives attracts the most miners, gets most hashrate, and therefore becomes Bitcoin. Long term, Bitcoin is a collective decision: It is whatever people choose to store value in. That’s why it must be protected early. Money and power is concentrated today, and Bitcoin must remain decentralized until power is decentralized again.

Why a restrictive consensus fork can gain traction even without explicit miner support. One of the main reasons this could work lies in the asymmetry of consensus rules. The current rules are broader, while the fork tightens consensus. A block that follows the fork rules is valid on the current chain, while a block that follows the current rules may be invalid on the fork. This creates a situation we have never seen in Bitcoin before. Before the fork actually happens, once the rules of the potential fork are in effect, a miner can choose to mine blocks that are accepted on both chains. By doing so, the miner earns rewards on both sides, avoids the risk of mining on the wrong chain, and retains the option to later sell coins on one chain after the fork while keeping exposure to the other. If a miner instead produces blocks that are valid only under the current rules, a chain split occurs and the miner earns rewards on only one chain. Up to this point, there is a clear economically dominant strategy: following the stricter rules minimizes risk and preserves optionality. As long as it is not completely clear which side would ultimately prevail, there is no economically rational incentive for a miner to take the first step and realize the chain split. Triggering the split would forfeit optionality and introduce asymmetric risk. Once the split actually occurs, this dominance disappears. From that moment on, the outcome remains uncertain at first, and miners can no longer rely on a risk-free strategy. They must instead estimate future fees, liquidity, and market value, and choose accordingly. In my view, this makes the initial activation of the fork economically unattractive, unless expected fees or external incentives become large enough to compensate for the added risk. As a result, it is entirely plausible that miners will voluntarily align with the fork’s stricter rules even without an explicit chain split.