Bitcoin Core's attack on Bitcoin's user base is fascinating. As a programmer, one of the first things you'll learn is to create useful abstractions and not leak implementation details onto your user base. This is crucial if most of your user base is non-technical. TL;DR - What happens when implementation details leak to a non-technical crowd When core developers narrate mempool policy, witness discounts, inscription paths, version bits, OP_RETURN limits, and soft-fork mechanics to a mostly non-technical user base, governance "leaks" without ceding control. Users inherit responsibility (anxiety, vigilance costs) but not power (they don't run code audits, write policy clients, or operate pools). In a low Gross Consent Product world, this leak is useful to the Controllers and intermediaries because it: - Expands the social attack surface (narratives, panic, brigading) while concentrating technical leverage (maintainers, pools, relay policy, app-store distribution). - Raises the "cost of being sovereign" (time, knowledge, operational burden), pushing the median user toward paperization (ETFs, custodians, on-ramp wallets). - Creates manufactured "consent cycles" — public comment drama around esoterica (v30 defaults, policy limits) that legitimize changes after the audience tires out. Leaking implementation details to the masses doesn't democratize Bitcoin; it socializes worry and privatizes control. In a low Gross Consent Product regime, that's a feature: it nudges users toward policy-safe defaults while maintaining the narrative of openness. Expect rising paper share, falling realized volatility, steerable settlement via pools/relays, and Medium-of-Exchange throttled in favor of stablecoins/CBDCs. It goes much deeper and I'll cover this in more detail later.